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I. INTRODUCTION 
Both the Philippines and Portugal have created institu-
tions to supply financial services for a lower income 
clientele in rural areas. In the Philippines a large number 
of unit banks were established for this purpose over the 
past two decades or more. These banks were given a munici-
pal charter to operate in one locale (as a single unit 
bank). By the early 1980s roughly 1,167 small rural banks 
were operating with these charters. Portugal, on the other 
hand, has created Agricultural Mutual Credit Cooperatives 
(CCAMs), a savings and loan cooperative, to operate in 
comparable settings, i.e. rural districts or municipalities 
(conselhos). These are institutionally distinct forms to 
service credit needs. One is a small private bank with 
capital shareholders while the other is a cooperative made 
up of members who are farmers. Nevertheless, both institu-
tions have faced similar problems and continue to struggle 
with similar issues. This is the theme of this paper, 
namely, the numerous problems compromising the financial 
viability of institutions serving a small farmer clientele. 
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II. RELEVANT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Philiopines Case 
The recent history of the rural banks in the Philip-
pines is instructive. Up to 1973, they were growing 
slowly but securely with their agricultural portfolios. 
Then from 1973 to 1980, the Massagana 99 Rice Program 
was launched to promote the adoption of new rice 
varieties in the Philippines. The dispersed network of 
rural banks was utilized as the principal vehicle to 
channel the credit financing this program. The central 
bank, using a rediscount line of credit for rice, 
increased credit flows many multiples beyond the 
volumes previously serviced by these banks. Moreover, 
this credit was issued at concessionary (i.e. subsi-
dized) interest rates which during some years became 
negative in real terms. The accumulated consequences 
of this action can be summarized as follows: 
1. Local deposit and savings mobilization was 
substantially discouraged and non-deposit, 
external sources of funding became the principal 
source of funding for these banks due to the low 
interest rates offered through the rediscount 
lines of credit; 
2. The lack of local deposit mobilization activity 
meant that there was no local constituency 
promoting depositor interests. Instead all 
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procedures and practices were designed to facili-
tate borrower interests. Credit was pushed 
quickly with little to no credit-worthiness 
studies and weak and passive loan recovery 
efforts; 
3. The heavy emphasis on a single crop meant that the 
rural bank portfolios became highly concentrated 
and more risky compared to earlier times; this 
lack of effective diversification of risk was 
reinforced by the lack of networking (i.e. not 
being part of a broader geographically based 
branch network). Each bank was forced to make 
ioans in their small geographical setting in 
largely a single type of loan. 
This increasingly concentrated portfolio, financed 
through external funding sources at subsidized interest 
rates with little to no credit evaluation or rigorous 
loan recovery practices, led to growing arrears. By 
the early 1980s with the decline of the Massagana Rice 
Program loan facility, many rural banks were unable to 
maintain loan activity due to an insufficient local 
deposit base for on-lending and limited experience in 
mobilizing and satisfactorily servicing local deposits. 
Past dues (i.e. arrears) increased dramatically. More 
and more banks fell into arrears with the Central Bank 
as their field level arrears with farmers meant they 
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could not repay their redjscounting obligations with 
the Central Bank. 
By the end of J986, rural bank failures had 
reduced the total number of banks from 1,167 in 1981 to 
867 banks. Of these remainjng banks, over 200 have 
insufficient capital (a risk asset ratio of less than 
10 percent, i.e. net worth over totaJ assets minus non-
risk assets) and past due ratios {arrears) above 25 
percent. These banks will be closed shortly. This 
state of affairs had led to an extensive bank rehabili-
tation program in which selected banks may convert all 
or part of their Central Bank arrearages into common 
stock owned by a government land bank in the Philip-
pines. To gain access to their right of conversion, 
the private owners of rural banks must come forth with 
fresh new capital to bring their risk asset ratio up to 
10 percent or to 10 percent of their outstanding 
Central Bank arrears whichever is higher. They would 
then have an obligation to buy back their equity 
converted arrears from the Land Bank of the Philippines 
in equal monthly installments not to exceed ten years. 
The lessons learned from this widespread financial 
collapse of the Philippines rural banking systems are 
several. They will be reviewed following a discussion 
of the Portuguese case. 
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The CCAMs in Portugal have had a much longer 
history than the rural banks in the Philippines. 
However it is only the recent history that concerns us 
here (i.e. from the 1970s to the present). Salient 
characteristics can be summarized as follows: 
1. In the 1970s the CCAMs had very little autonomy as 
they fell under the national network of the Caixa 
Geral de Depositos (CGD). In a sense they were a 
retail outlet for special lines of credit chan-
neled through the CGD for small scale agricultural 
finance. Local deposit mobilization was minimal 
to non-existent and autonomy in portfolio manage-
ment was severely restricted through the CGD link 
and supervisory role. 
2. From June, 1980 onwards ample financing for the 
agricultural credit cooperatives was made avail-
able through IFADAP. At the same time new legal 
statutes allowed the CCAM network to gain their 
autonomy from CGD tuteledge to operate indepen-
dently with IFADAP funding. IFADAP funding 
largely replaced previous funding on the liabili-
ties side of the CCAMs balance sheet. The 
increased importance of the CCAM's was aided by a 
large emphasis on increasing agricultural credit 
at this time. Some modest local deposit mobiliza-
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tion was also undertaken. This phase, in the 
unfolding transformation of the CCAMs, was 
somewhat comparable to the ample financing of rice 
farming in the Philippine scenario in that many 
CCAMs gained acGess to volumes of IFADAP funding 
many times larger than they had been used to in 
the past. Not surprisingly an OSU evaluation of 
rural financial markets in Portugal in early 1985 
discovered that many of these CCAMs were exper-
iencing high arrears. 
3. From 1984-5 to the present, the CCAMs moved into 
yet another phase in their evolution in which 
local deposit mobilization became much more 
visible as the principal source of funds and a 
Central Liquidity Fund (Caixa Central) was 
established to act as a funds clearinghouse for 
the nationaJ network of CCAMs. At the same time 
national policies have been implemented liberal-
izing financial markets. Thus by the mid 1980s 
rural financial markets are being serviced by a 
healthier and more competitive mix of inter-
mediaries than that characterizing the late 1970s. 
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Prior to outlining some remaining problem areas, 
it is useful to complete the CCAM scenario with some 
additional facts concerning their operations in the 
financial markets of Portugal. Loan rates in CCAMs are 
around 19 to 20 percent. Deposit rates are approxi-
mately 8.5 percent for savings accounts and 12 percent 
for time deposits. Hence if we assume an even balance 
between the two funding sources the gross margin of 
financial intermediation is roughly 10 points. To 
determine the net margins, one would have to estimate 
non-financia1 operational costs and subtract these from 
the gross margin. With inflation between 9 to 11 
percent, savers are either breaking even·or losing 
purchasing power through a slight negative real rate of 
interest on their deposits. Borrowers, on the other 
hand, are paying positive real rates of interest on 
their loans. Loans are partially "targeted" in that 
they are presumably only for agricultural purposes. 
The CCAMs are linked to three institutions in 
Portugal. The Central Bank is responsible for exami-
ning and auditing their accounts. The CCAMs are exempt 
from reserve requirements. CCAM deposits are also 
exempt from income tax obligations which (in combina-
a 
tion wjth no reserve rP.quirements) would give the CCAMs 
a competitive advantage over the nationalized commer-
ciaJ banks in b~ing able to offer higher deposit rates. 
This competitive advantage, however, is partially 
negated through the reserve requirement CCAMs have to 
contribute to the general funds of the Central Liquid-
ity Fund (Caixa Central) which is the same rate as the 
reserve requirement for commercial banks. Currently 
this is 15 percent on checking deposjts and 8 percent 
on time deposits. If we assume a liability structure 
made up of 70 percent time deposits and 30 percent 
checking deposits, this gives a weighted average of 10 
percent for the reserve requirements of the CCAMs. 
This reserve requirement contribution along with a 
small share in the Caixa Central and allows the CCAMs 
the opportunity to participate in the clearinghouse 
services for their excess funds. At present, the Caixa 
Central pay CCAMs 16 percent for their excess funds. 
The Caixa largely invests these in risk-free government 
securities at 16.5 percent and, occasionally, services 
the loan demand of deficit CCAMs (currently at an 18 
percent loan rate. Since its opening in 1984, 190 
CCAMs have become members of the Caixa Central. In 
large part this membership is forced since the CCAMs 
are prohibited from depositing their excess reserves in 
the branches of commercial banks. With no other outlet 
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possible for clearing purposes and reserve management 
needs, CCAMs have no option other than joining the 
Caixa Central. 
The third institution linked to the CCAMs is 
FENACAM. This is the National Federation of CCAMs 
which acts as a lobbyist on behalf of the National 
Membership. It also offers professional technical 
assistance and auditing services for its member CCAMs. 
At the same time FENACAM generates centralized informa-
tion on the CCAM network and provides additional 
services such as check books, calendars, etc ... for 
their member CCAMs. The member cooperatives contribute 
2 percent of their annual profits to support FENACAM. 
Finally, FENACAM is also a shareholder in the Caixa 
Central along with the member CCAMs. 
The problems and challenges facing the CCAMs in 
Portugal are several. The main theme characterizing 
the problems and the challenges is the issue of 
centralization versus decentralization or, put dif-
ferently, a paternalistic concern to direct and control 
the operations of these small rural intermediaries vs 
the interest of allowing these institutions substantial 
independence to manage their own liquidity and port-
folio free from centralized targeted controls. Within 
this thematic context the remaining problems and 
challenges can be summarized as follows: 
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1. The most important remaining problems in the CCAMs 
is the lack of geographical ana portfolio diver-
sj fication. Restricting CCAM lending activity to 
a single municipality and, moreover, to agricul-
tural loans alone increase the 15kelihood of an 
unbalanced, high cost portfolio concentrated into 
the riskiest sector of activity. Further, the 
lack of a wider geographical territory and broader 
range of allowable loans prevents the CCAMs from 
expanding sufficiently to enjoy scale economies 
lowering their unit costs of operation; 
2. The biggest challenge facing the CCAMs today is 
acquiring the skills to manage a growing base of 
liquidity and a more diversified portfolio from 
locally mobilized deposits. In previous eras, 
targeted loans and heavy supervis1on largely 
precluded the need to develop an independent loan 
evaluation skill. With the growth in the local 
deposit base replacing external, targeted funding 
sources, local management has to upgrade their 
liabjljty and asset management ski11s. 
3. The hlgh reserve requirement for CCAMs in the 
Caixa Central (around 10 percent) raise questions 
concerning the benefits gained from such a cost. 
To date the Caixa Central merely invests these 
excess funds in risk-free government bonds thereby 
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financing the government deficit. The benefits 
would be clearer if this clearinghouse role 
included more inter-spatial intermediation within 
the national network of CCAMs. 
4. More information is needed on the viability of 
CCAMs by size and geographical setting. It is 
important to document the costs per escudo lent to 
determine the scale economy potential in the 
national network. Similarly present accounting 
practices are ambiguous concerning the classif ica-
tion of delinquent loans and loan loss provisions. 
Until both the costs and arrears data are better 
documented and reported, it is difficult to 
determine if the current gross margin of financial 
intermediation is excessive or insufficient to 
achieve financial viability. 
5. Current economic conditions appear to have created 
excess reserves in the CCAM network. This could 
be due to three factors: a depressed economy and 
a low demand for loans; poor management unable to 
find good loan opportunities; and too restricted a 
local market to market all the locally mobilized 
deposits. If the root causes for this high excess 
liquidity are the second two factors· mentioned 
above, technical assistance and regulatory changes 
could help expand the loan activity of CCAMs. 
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6. The Central Bank may find it convenjent to promote 
the growth of the Caixa Central since its facili-
tat~s its administrative responsibjlities with 
respect to the member caixinhas. While the Caixa 
Central's clearinghouse role of jntermediating 
between deficit and surplus emits in the system is 
a valuable function, reporting and examination 
responsibilities should always remain in the 
Central Bank. Finally, and this is of strategic 
importance, a growing Caixa Central should 
primarily emphasize financial intermediation among 
its member coops and not overload the system by 
bringing large amounts of external funds into the 
system. This could create increased moral hazard, 
patronage and default. 
7. Finally a new national agricultural cooperative -
commercial bank may gradually emerge in the future 
from the evolving network of CCAMs and the Caixa 
Central in which the 220 caixinhas could become 
branches in a national network controlled through 
a head off ice in Lisbon. Thjs is not necessarily 
an unwelcome process if the new bank becomes a 
strong healthy national institution servicing an 
agricultural (and a non-agricultural) clientele 
efficiently. However, an alternative scenario 
should also be considered, namely, allowing 
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regional banks to emerge in 15 to 20 districts 
throughout the country in which local caixinhas 
become formal branches of a regionally based 
cooperative bank. This could create a more 
competitive set of institutions in the country 
than the single national bank discussed above. 
The pros and cons of these two alternative 
expansion paths merit discussions. 
III. CONCLUDING COMMENTS: LESSONS LEARNED 
Although institutionally distinct, the Philippines and 
Portuguese small farmers financial intermediaries have 
experienced many common problems and faced similar chal-
lenges. First, both have experienced the difficulties of 
relying heavily upon external funding sources. This 
external source of funding transforms the institution into 
an incomplete financial intermediary that only offers loans 
and minimizes deposit services for their local clientele. 
Secondly, once a successfuJ deposit mobiJization effort had 
been undertaken, both institutions faced the challenge of 
acquiring new management skills. In the absence of targeted 
loans from higher authorities, local management now have to 
determine the credit worthiness of local loan demand in such 
a way as to minimize the risk of default to protect deposi-
tor interests. 
Thirdly, both institutions face the problem of a 
restrictive charter that limits geographical and portfolio 
14 
diversification and, consequently, the potential for scale 
economies. In both cases, more detailed cost st11dies are 
required to determine the transaction costs of servicing 
their clientele and the appropriate margins for financial 
intermediation. At the same time, better arrears accounting 
is necessary to aid in an on-going revjew of their financial 
viability. 
Finally, in the case of Portugal, it is instructive to 
evaluate the benefits and the costs of the Caixa Central 
from the point of view of the CCAMs. A clearing house 
function that engages in significant interspatial inter-
mediation clearly improves resource a1Joca1ion through the 
financial system. The question here is the degree to which 
this is occurring and at what cost to the member CCAMs. 
In summary, both sets of institutions in the two 
countries are excellent examples of small scale inter-
mediaries attempting to service a small scale local clien-
tele. It should not be surprising to note similar problems 
and challenges. It is to be hoped that studies can continue 
to monitor the performance of these two systems as they face 
a challenging future in an increasingly deregulated f inan-
cial milieu characteristic of both countries jn the mid-to-
late 1980s. 
